On July 11th 2017 the Dutch senate passed new legislation concerning the power and reach of the Dutch intelligence services. This law is supposed to come into effect no later than January 1st 2018. It authorises the AVID (similar to American FBI) en MIVD (similar to American CIA) to intercept and record random wireless telecommunications, i.e. the Internet. In addition, they can directly gain access corporate databases and share all this data with foreign services. This is by no means something completely new. For years, the Netherlands has had the questionable honour of being one the most “tapped” societies of Europe. In the past American officials have bragged that their situation at least is not as bad as “ours”. Dutch citizens have always had a laissez-faire attitude towards such news; they often proclaim that they have nothing to hide, thus have nothing to fear.
With respect to this law Hans de Zwart of Bits for Freedom, an independent Dutch digital rights foundation, has pointed out that: “Within a few years, it will technically feasible and – more importantly – affordable for the government to monitor everyone 100%.” (transl. via www.bof.nl). He was not alone in his concerns as this new law faces much resistance from various non-Governmental organisations and now even from Dutch citizens themselves. Last week, a student initiative was successful in collecting over 300,000 signatures to call for an advisory referendum on the matter. But why all this protest? Surely, it is not strange to give our services power to monitor the internet? Sure the majority of all civil communication takes place on the internet, but so does terrorist and criminal communication. This is all true, however I would argue that we should be very wary of handing over to much authority over Big Data collection and analysis to anyone. Popularly known as the Sleepwet, or Trawl-Law, it enables intelligence services to use a large and wide trawl to collect internet data. Herein, the data collected for the purpose of locating potential terrorist contains a lot of information on innocent civilians. It almost seems like terrorist are an accidental by-catch in a see of “innocent” data, whilst it should be the other way around! Just like a regular trawl causes environmental damage, this Trawl-law causes societal (privacy) damage. I would argue that any law on such a matter should forcefully impose privacy by design, especially considering future technological developments. These include drones, advanced data-analytics combined with new surveillance means, and the data-abundance caused by the Internet of Things. In doing so, it underestimates privacy risks and concerns. As a result, we will be acting as if at any times a police agent is watching over our shoulder. Last August, the American Department of Justice requested the details of 1.3 miljoen visitors of an anti-Trump website. How free would you feel to critique Donald J. Trump?
It seems clear all these technologies that we will be studying this year are able to bring about meaningful change in the world. However, especially as BIM’ers we should be aware with the hazards and risks that come along with this Brave New World. As mo data in the wrong hands, means mo problems.
The petition is still open: https://sleepwet.nl/ (Dutch natives only)
Sources:
Parool (2017). Wat houdt de omstreden ‘sleepwet’ precies in?. [online] Available at: https://www.parool.nl/binnenland/wat-houdt-de-omstreden-sleepwet-precies-in~a4520844/ [Accessed 10 Oct. 2017].
The Atlantic (2017). Can the U.S. Government Seize an Anti-Trump Website’s Visitor Logs? [online] Available at: ://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/department-of-justice-dreamhost-trump-visitor-logs-million-ip/536886/ [Accessed 10 Oct. 2017].
Volkskrant (2013). Voormalig NSA-chef: In Nederland wordt veel meer afgeluisterd. [online] Available at: https://www.volkskrant.nl/tech/voormalig-nsa-chef-in-nederland-wordt-veel-meer-afgeluisterd~a3484020/ [Accessed 10 Oct. 2017].
Volkskrant (2012). Nederland koploder in afluisteren telefoons. [online] Available at: https://www.volkskrant.nl/politiek/nederland-koploper-in-afluisteren-telefoons~a3259801/ [Accessed 10 Oct. 2017].
Zwart, H. de (2017). Overheidssurveillance, waar trekken we de grens? [online] Available at: https://www.bof.nl/2017/03/10/overheidssurveillance-waar-trekken-we-de-grens/ [Accessed 10 Oct. 2017].
Great blog that clearly points out the privacy concerns regarding this new legislation. I agree with you, but I am also aware of the actual aim of this law. The boundary between privacy violation and protection is unclear in this case. Therefore, I hope that by supporting the referendum the law will be adjusted in a way that most privacy concerns are taken away, while intelligence services are still able to track down communication of (potential) terrorist. We should be aware of the Orwellian hazards and dangers, but we should be aware of the need of protection too.