On the night of September 9-10, about 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace during nightly drone strikes on Ukraine. The incursion went on until early in the morning and forced NATO jets of the Polish, Italian and Dutch air forces to scramble (Charlish, Kelly, & Erling, 2025). Three drones were eventually shot down by million-dollar F35-missiles, a cost around a thousand times the cost of the Russian drones. Although they were not used, Patriot missile air defences were also put on high alert in Poland, which have a cost of about $4 million per missile (Lendon, 2025).
The cost discrepancy between the drones and air defences prompted me to think about the ‘market’ dynamics at play in this interaction. I will assess this dynamic in light of Clayton Christen’s Theory of Disruptive Innovation, which he set out in his book “The Innovators Dilemma” (1997).
Although drones have existed for almost a hundred years, the real mass-market availability appeared in the 2010s (Singh & Kumar, 2010) (AXON, 2023). Clearly, these drones did not have the capabilities of conventional missiles. However, Christensen states “Disruptive technologies typically underperform established products in mainstream markets. But they have other features that a few fringe customers value” (Christensen, 1997). An example of this are rebel groups in the middle east and smaller conventional militaries (UNIDIR, 2024).
Then, according to Christensen’s theory, the disruptive innovation becomes more mainstream. The Ukraine war erupted, and drone use became widespread. Million-dollar tanks and other material were being destroyed at a fraction of the cost. The technology improved and new dimensions of value appeared, such as cost, flexibility and scalability. The incumbent’s dominance is coming under direct threat.
Even though the incumbent becomes aware of the disruption, Christensen argues that its existing structures, such as bureaucracy, sunk cost and company culture complicate formulating a decisive response. Decisionmakers rather commit to improving or adapting existing, proven technology, than take a risk with their career prospects. Companies are additionally motivated by retaining the high profit margins on premium products, rather than sacrificing those.
Now, some three years into drones becoming mainstream in warfare, it seems the incumbent is waking up. Will it be able to adapt to the new reality?
References
AXON. (2023). From https://www.axon.com/resources/history-of-drones?
Charlish, A., Kelly, L., & Erling, B. (2025, September 10). Poland downs drones in its airspace, becoming first NATO member to fire during war in Ukraine. From Reuters.com: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10/
Christensen, C. (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma. Harvard Business School Press.
Lendon, B. (2025, July 5). What are Patriot missiles and why does Ukraine need them so badly? From CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/15/europe/trump-ukraine-patriot-missile-batteries-intl-hnk-ml#:~:text=Hefty%20price%20tag,Patriot%20batteries%20in%20their%20arsenals.
Singh, R., & Kumar, S. (2010). A Comprehensive Insights into Drones: History, Classification, Architecture, Navigation, Applications, Challenges, and Future Trends.
UNIDIR. (2024). The Use of Uncrewed Aerial Systems by Non-State Armed Groups.
